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1. Introduction
Much of our naive reasoning a bout space involves reasoning about holes
and holed objects. We put things in holes, through holes, around them; we
jump out of a hole or fall into one; we compare holes, measure them, enlarge
them, ll them up.
What exactly holes are, or even whether such dubious entities do indeed
exist, these are of course questions one eventually needs to address in order
to make good sense of such forms of reasoning. For instance, treating holes
as (parts of) material objects, say, by identifying them with hole-linings
[21], would call for an account of the altered meaning of certain predicates
or prepositions. (What would `inside' and `outside' mean? What would it
mean to `enlarge' a hole?) On the other hand, a non-realist attitude would
require some radical eliminative strategy, some systematic way of paraphras-
ing every hole-committing sentence by means of a sentence that does not
refer to or quantify over holes [20] (the cheese is holed, but there is no hole
in it). This might well be a favorable strategy, provided the language contain
all the necessary shape-predicates: after all, holes are a paradigm example
of nothings.
The general philosophical hypothesis underlying the present work is that
one should resist these ways out in favor of a realist, common-sense attitude.
Holes are enigmatic, and it may be utterly dicult to specify adequate iden-
tity and individuation criteria for them. Yet, if there is an ontology inherent
in our everyday reasoning about the world, then this ontology comprises
holes (and cognate entities such as cracks, cuts, or ssures) along with stones
and chunks of cheese. This view stems from joint work with Roberto Casati
and has been largely presented in [3], where a basic formalism is also in-
troduced to spell out the major tenets and consequences of a realist theory.
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on that formalism and to illustrate
how it can be exploited to provide a framework for more general patterns
of qualitative spatial reasoning. In particular, after a general outline, I shall
focus on some issues pertaining to the modelling, the representation, and
the taxonomy of spatial inclusion. This is a topic that has received much
attention in recent work in spatial reasoning, also in connection to a variety
of applications, from naive physics to natural language semantics. My hope
is to show that explicit commitment to holes as bona de individuals intro-
duces a novel and revealing (albeit certainly far from complete) perspective
also with respect to such issues.
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2. The Basic Theory
I shall begin with the general picture: countenancing holes calls for some
explicit theory (i.e., set of principles) about these entities | their identity
conditions, their part-whole relations, their patterns of interaction with the
environment. The picture will be necessarily schematic and in large strokes,
and I shall have to refer to previous work for the underlying motivations.
I shall, however, take the opportunity to introduce some novelties and re-
nements into the account which will result into a simplied and somewhat
more rened theory | particularly for the purpose of qualitative spatial
reasoning | than the one originally outlined in [3].
Various independent domains come to interact in the development of this
general picture. Focusing on the extensional core, four main domains may
be distinguished:
{ ontology (holes are parasitic entities);
{ mereology (holes may bear part-whole relations to one another);
{ topology (holes are one-piece things located at the surfaces of their hosts);
{ morphology (holes are llable, and can be penetrated by other objects).
I shall deal with these domains in turn, working within the framework of
a rst-order language with descriptions. The underlying logical machinery
will be deliberately left vague. (In eect, why should holes make a dier-
ence?) A preferred option is a free quantication theory with some means for
dealing with improper descriptions, but a more classical framework might
provide a viable basis as well. As for the notation, I shall use `:', `^', `_',
`!', and `$' as connectives respectively for negation, conjunction, disjunc-
tion, material implication, and material equivalence (in decreasing order of
strength); `8' and `9' for the universal and existential quantiers; and `{' for
the denite descriptor. As a rule, the outermost quantiers in universally
quantied formulas will be omitted to simplify readability.
2.1. Ontology. Holes are sui generis. They are spatiotemporally located,
like stones and chunks of cheese, but they are not made of anything. They
are not just regions of space either; for holes can move (as happens anytime
you move a piece of Swiss cheese), whereas spatial regions cannot. In fact
holes are always in or through something else, and this makes them onto-
logically parasitic entities: they cannot exist without (or be removed from)
a material host. You can't have the hole without the doughnut, so to say.
This form of ontological dependence likens holes to other underpriv-
iledged entities, such as surfaces or other boundary elements (see e.g. [6]). It
should be distinguished from the purely conceptual or de dicto dependence
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exemplied by sentences such as \every sister has a sibling": there cannot
exist sisters without siblings, but it is not true of any sister that she could
not have existed as an only child. By contrast, a hole cannot exist except
as a hole in something, so it suers from a form of truly de re dependence.
(This also explains the dierence between the dependence of the hole on
the doughnut vs. the dependence of the latter on the former. Surely you
cannot have a holeless doughnut. But that is a form of conceptual depen-
dence, nothing more. If you cut your doughnut into pieces, the hole goes,
the doughnut stays | though its shape is now dierent.) This form of de
re dependence in turn should be distinguished from stronger forms, such as
the dependence of a grimace on a face. That grimace can only exist as an
expression on that face. But one can in principle change the host's matter,
its shape, or even the entire host without aecting the hole in it. In other
words, holes are not rigidly dependent on their hosts (in the terminology of
[34]). Something is a hole if and only if it is a hole in something.
It is of course impossible to do justice to these distinctions without re-
sorting in some way to modal notions. However, for our purposes the op-
position between rigid and generic dependence is not essential, and we can
initially content ourselves with emphasizing the de dicto/de re opposition.
This could be done directly, by assuming a primitive relation of dependence
and then asserting that all holes (entities of a kind) bear that relation to
some material objects. (The relation will have to be governed by suitable
axioms, e.g. along the lines of [12].) Alternatively, we can simply express
the desired feature by taking as a starting point a relational primitive, say
`H(x; y)', to be read as \x is a hole in (or through) y". This is the strat-
egy followed in [3], and I shall adhere to it in the present context. We may
lose something in expressive power, but it goes straight to the point: there
are no holes simpliciter | holehood is a relational property. An interesting
generalization would be to rely on a three-place relation, `H(x; y; z)', mean-
ing \x is a hole in (or through) y relative to z". This would do justice to
the intuition that the notion of a hole is somewhat context-dependent. (A
roof-window is a hole in the roof in some respect, but not in others. It lets
the light in, not the rain.) However I shall not pursue this line of generaliza-
tion, for reasons of simplicity and also because the relevant distinctions can
eventually be dealt with by taking into account the way a hole can be lled
(Section 2.4 below). A see-through ller is no light deterrent, but it stops
the rain; a cloth ller will make a nice curtain, but it'll rain in.
Let then `H(x; y)' stand for \x is a hole in (or through) y". We take this
relation to be governed by the following basic axiom, which denes the main
constraint on the hole-host relationship:
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AH1 H(x; y)! :H(y; z).
That is, the host of a hole is not itself a hole. It follows immediately that
H is irreexive and asymmetric; no hole is a hole in itself, and there is no
room for holey loops:
TH1 :H(x; x)
TH2 H(x; y)! :H(y; x).
Moreover, AH1 suces to certify some basic facts about holes. For instance,
holes are holeless, i.e., cannot host other holes, and cannot exist unless some
other sort of entity also exists:










This is not to deny that a hole may be part of another hole (contrary to
[2]). Nor does TH3 rule out the possibility that a hole can be located inside
another hole. Imagine placing a holed piece of Gruyere inside a hole in a
bigger chunk of Emmenthaler. Or think of the topologists' \hole through
the hole in the hole": a hole connects one face of a cube to an opposite
face after bifurcating into two separate channels for part of the way, and
a second hole passes between the two channels to connect two other faces.
Such situations are perfectly consistent with the view that a hole cannot be a
hole in another hole. Every hole needs a material host and cannot, therefore,
be the host of other holes. But holes are immaterial and can, therefore, be
interpenetrated by other entities | including other holes. Something can
be spatially enclosed in a hole without being a part thereof. The rest of
the theory is concerned precisely with these situations | with the multiple
ways a hole can bear spatial relations with other things, be they immaterial
bodies, material objects, or simply regions of space.
2.2. Mereology. The principles governing the relevant part-whole relation-
ships can be formulated within the framework of formal mereology, eventu-
ally supplemented with specic axioms on H. The parts of a hole are not in
the hole in the same sense in which the hole is in its host; and the relation-
ship of a hole to its host is not a relation of part to whole. Putting a coin
in the hole of a doughnut does not make it become part of the doughnut.
Nor does the coin occupy part of the doughnut | say, a \negative" part, as
some have suggested [19]. Holes have nothing in common with their hosts,
however negatively you look at them, and the holehood relation must be
supplemented by an independent parthood relation. (This is not uncontro-
versial, and I refer to [5] for further elaborations.)
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The exact format of the background part-whole apparatus is arguably
not quite binding. That is, it should be independently motivated, and I
should like to think that hole-related reasoning is compatible with a variety
of mereological theories. For the sake of deniteness, however, I shall here
rely on a version of classical extensional mereology based on the primitive
relation \x is a (possibly improper) part of y", written `P(x; y)'. This has
the following axioms
AP1 P(x; y)$ 8
z










where `O' (overlap) is dened as usual as sharing of a common part:




(P(z; x)^ P(z; y)).
Thus, by AP1 parthood amounts to inclusion of overlappers: this ensures
that P be an extensional partial ordering (reexive, antisymmetric, and tran-
sitive) whereas O is reexive and symmetric, but not transitive. By AP2,
every satised condition ' picks out a unique entity consisting of all 'ers,
viz. their \fusion". This is perfectly standard and yields a classical exten-
sional mereology in the sense of [34], corresponding to a Boolean algebra
with the bottom element removed. As I said, other accounts are in principle
compatible with the present purposes, but I prefer to rely on the classical
account for deniteness and for reasons of simplicity. Of course this is not
uncontroversial. In particular, AP2 is sometimes questioned on the grounds
that it has counter-intuitive instances when ' is true of scattered entities
(each and every table, or my nose and your favorite restaurant). From a
purely mereological prospective, however, I think this is not an issue. One
may feel uncomfortable with treating unheard-of Goodmanian mixtures as
individuals. But which individuals are more \natural" than others | which
sums count as genuine wholes | is not a mereological question. In fact it is a
question that cannot even be formulated in mereological terms, and requires
reference precisely to the sort of topological notions considered below. (See
[42, 43] for developments of this argument.)
Other derived notions that will be used in the following include proper
parthood (PP), identity (=), and the operations of general sum () and
product () justied by AP2, along with the usual quasi-boolean functors
for binary sum (+), product (), dierence ( ), and complement ():
DP2 PP(x; y) =
df
P(x; y)^ :P(y; x)
DP3 x = y =
df
P(x; y)^ P(y; x)
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DP6 x+ y =
df
z(P(z; x)_ P(z; y))
DP7 x y =
df
z(P(z; x)^ P(z; y))
DP8 x  y =
df




(The functors introduced by DP4{DP9 will of course be partially dened
| i.e., they may correspond to improper descriptions unless we go with
the ction of a null individual that is part of everything, as in [23]. This
introduces some complexities into the underlying logic: we may adopt a
Russellian theory of descriptions (as in [22]), or we may opt for some free
logic (compare [35]). Again, since these questions do not depend specically
on the application at issue, I shall leave them open.) We can also add some
mixed notions, such as being a (proper) hole-part:










Thus, a (proper) hole-part is a (proper) part which qualies as a hole |
though not a hole in the same entity of which it is a part. (This is not ruled
out by the denition, but will soon become apparent.)
On these grounds, the specic axioms on the interplay between P and
H are now as follows. First of all, we have a sort of extensionality axiom,
likening holehood to other ontologically fundamental properties. I have left
it open whether a hole can have more than one host. In fact it can, given
our general mereological set-up: a hole in the pocket is a hole in the jacket,
if the pocket is part of the jacket. More importantly, however, we want to
ensure that two distinct holes cannot share exactly the same hosts (at a
given time) | that is, if two holes are distinct, one must always be able
to cut any common host (if any) into two disjoint parts, one of which will
host exactly one hole (not the other). More generally, the intended relation





(H(x; y)! H(z; y))! P(z; x).






(H(x; y)$ H(z; y))! x = z.
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As most extensionality principles, AP3 and TP1 may of course fail if we
take parthood and identity as relations across time. You can destroy some
of the hosts (e.g., by destroying some parts thereof) without aecting the
identity of the hole. However, relative to a xed temporal instant AP3 and
TP1 express important principles of the \hole in" relation: without them,
it would be hard to put any upper bound on the number of immaterial
parasites that can inhabit what | in ordinary thinking | is the region of
a single hole. (Some potential counterexamples to TP1 are discussed in [3],
the emphasis being on the possibility that two distinct holes may at times
be perfectly co-located. However it is not clear whether exact co-location
should imply identity of hosts. If we do not make that assumption, AP3
will be a safe and simple identity criterion for the purpose of extensional
reasoning. On the other hand, note that this result is only achieved thanks
to AP2, which allows one to single out any denable part. In the absence of
AP2, or in the context of a dierent mereological set-up, AP3 might have
to be suitably weakened to avoid identifying holes which happen to share a
non-separable host.)
In addition to the extensionality axiom, we then have axioms concerning
specic patterns of part-whole relations. The following is a basic set:
AP4 H(x; y)! :O(x; y)
AP5 H(x; y)^ H(z; w)^O(x; z)! O(y; w)
AP6 H(x; y)^ H(x; z)! 9
w
(PP(w; y z) ^H(x; w))
AP7 H(x; y)^ H(z; y)! 8
w
(HP(w; x+ z)! H(w; y)).
AP4 expresses the above-mentioned idea that a hole in an object is not a
part of that object | indeed, it does not even overlap with it. Of course, this
does not rule out that a hole may overlap the host of another hole: the sum
of the hole in John's pocket and the slice of Swiss cheese on Mary's plate |
an entity whose existence is admitted by AP2 | is a scattered individual,
partly material and partly immaterial, hosting every hole in that piece of
cheese. On this basis, AP5 guarantees that overlapping holes must have
overlapping hosts, while the remaining two axioms are essentially meant to
ensure that H and P interact in the appropriate way given AP4{AP5. By
AP6, the common part of any two hosts of a hole must itself be a host of the
hole. More specically, this must be true of some proper part of that common
part: there is no way one can pick out a smallest host for a given hole. (This
reects an underlying assumption to the eect that space is dense. Minor
adjustments would be required to accommodate dierent views.) By AP7,
we also have it that the common host of two (or more) holes is likewise a
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host of any hole-part thereof. This implies inter alia a form of monotonicity
of H with respect to P: the hole-parts of a hole are hosted by every host
of the hole. This is a form of left monotonicity. In [3] there is also a right
monotonicity axiom to the eect that any extension of a hole's host is itself
a host of that hole, unless it is a hybrid entity overlapping the hole itself
(e.g., the extension obtained by summing the host and part of the hole).
The proviso is needed to avoid collision with AP4. But actually something
stronger is required: as it stands that axiom would imply for instance that
if you take a brick with a hole full of plaster, the given hole is also a hole
in the sum brick+plaster | which is false. The correct formulation should
strengthen the relevant proviso to the general case of spatial (as opposed to
mereological) overlap between the hole and the host's extension. This form
of overlap can be treated as a topological relation, and the axiom is therefore
postponed to the next section. (See AC7 below.)
Several other important facts follow immediately from AP4{AP7. For
example, it follows that a host cannot be part of a hole (a strengthening of
AH1), or that mereological atoms (i.e., things that have no proper parts)
are bound to be holeless. Here is a sample list of such basic theorems:
TP2 H(x; y)! :P(x; y) (by AP4)
TP3 H(x; y)^H(x; z)! O(y; z) (by AP5)
TP4 H(x; y)! 9
z
(PP(z; y)^ H(x; z)) (by AP6)
TP5 H(x; y)^H(x; z)! :H(x; y   z) (by AP6)
TP6 H(x; y)^ P(y; z)! :H(x; z   y) (by AP6)





H(x; y). (by AP6)
Further stipulative principles can of course be added to strengthen the the-
ory. For instance, in [3] we also have an axiom to the eect that no hole is
atomic (though a hole's parts need not necessarily be hole-parts):
AP8 H(x; y)! 9
z
PP(z; x).
This rules out the possibility of treating as a holed object the result, say,
of removing a point from a sphere (in agreement with standard topological
practice). Holes are spacious, after all. Here, however, I shall conne myself
to the core theory dened by AP3{AP7, leaving out any further stipulative
principles such as AP8.
2.3. Topology. I see topology as providing a natural next step after mere-
ology in the development of a comprehensive part-whole theory [41, 43].
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Parthood is a relational concept, wholeness a global property. And in spite
of a natural tendency to think of mereology as a theory of parts and wholes,
the latter notion cannot be explained in terms of the former. For every whole
there is a set of (possibly potential) parts; for every set of parts (i.e., arbi-
trary objects) there is by AP2 a complete whole, viz. its mereological sum.
But there is no way, mereologically, to draw a distinction between \good"
and \bad" wholes; there is no way one can distinguish between a one-piece
entity, such as a stone or a rope, and a scattered entity made up of vari-
ous disconnected parts, such as a broken cup or an archipelago (or a soccer
tournament, in the temporal realm) by reasoning exclusively in terms of
parthood. Thus, the notion of connectedness runs afoul of plain mereology,
and a theory of parts and wholes really needs to incorporate a topologi-
cal machinery of some sort. This becomes apparent especially in connection
with qualitative reasoning about space and time: here mereology proves use-
ful to account for certain basic relationships among things or events; but one
needs topology to account, say, for the fact that two objects or events can
be continuous with each other, or for the relation of something being inside,
abutting, or surrounding something else. (My present concern will be with
the mereotopology of spatial structures; I have explored eventive and other
temporal structures in joint work with Fabio Pianesi [25, 26, 27].)
There are many ways of combining mereology and topology, and the
patterns of interaction between these two domains are still a rather under-
developed eld of research. A most neutral way is simply that of adding a
topological component to a mereological basis, using for this purpose a new
primitive or set of primitives. This is the strategy favored here. Following
in the footsteps of [45], the topological primitive will be a binary relation of
topological connection (we could as well use the notion of boundary, or that
of interior parthood: see [26, 36, 38, 42] for some such alternatives). This
relation will be denoted by `C(x; y)' and will be read \x is connected with
y". However, our domain does not merely consist of spatial or spatiotem-
poral regions but also (rather) of the sort of entities that may inhabit such
regions | ordinary entities such as stones, chunks of cheese, holes. Accord-
ingly, connection will be taken to express co-location at (rather than sharing
of ) some point in space-time. More precisely, on the intended interpretation
something x is connected with something y if and only if either x and the
closure of y or y and the closure of x are co-located at some point (where the
closure is, as usual, the thing together with its boundary; see [4, 24] for a
discussion of the interplay between mereotopology and locative structures).
This extension in the meaning of `C' is important, as it obviously aects the
entire topological machinery to be considered.
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Coming now to the specic format of this topological component, its
exact formulation is once again a exible matter, and various options are
in principle available. I shall therefore only spell out the necessary axioms.
These include the following two, which ensure that C be reexive and sym-
metric (via AP1):
AC1 C(x; x)
AC2 P(x; y)! 8
z
(C(x; z)! C(z; y)).
Many systems developed under the impact of [7, 8] also assume the con-
verse of AC2 (or something to that eect), with the consequence of reducing
mereology to topology: see e.g. [1, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 44]. However, this is
too strong on the present interpretation of C: an object can be totally inside
a hole, hence totally connected with it, without actually sharing any parts
with it (think again of the holed piece of Gruyere oating inside a hole in
the Emmenthaler). This is indeed the reason why we have to interpret `C'
as suggested: insofar as holes are immaterial, they can be interpenetrated
by other entities; hence we cannot investigate the topology of the entities in
our domain of discourse by studying the topology of the regions that they
occupy. Holes do not occupy the region at which they are located.
Given AC1{AC2, we can then dene various auxiliary notions such as
self-connectedness (SC), spatial enclosure (E), spatial overlapping, or inter-
section (I), external connection, or abutting (A), superposition (S), interior








(y + z = x! C(y; z))




(C(z; x)! C(z; y))




(E(z; x)^ E(z; y))
DC4 A(x; y) =
df
C(x; y)^ :I(x; y)
DC5 S(x; y) =
df
I(x; y)^ :O(x; y)





DC7 IP(x; y) =
df
P(x; y)^ :TP(x; y)





DC9 IE(x; y) =
df
E(x; y)^ :TE(x; y).
Note that some of these relations are made available precisely by the pos-
sibility that topologically connected entities bear no mereological relation-
ship to one another, leaving room for a much richer taxonomy than usually
recognized: overlapping is included in, but does not coincide with, inter-
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section, which in turn is properly included in the relation of connection.
The basic picture is given in Figure 1 (see [43] for a fuller account). It also
bears emphasis that these notions induce a mereotopology on the locative
structure corresponding to the entities in our ontology, via the equation
E(x; y) , P(r(x); r(y)), where r(x) is the region at which x is exactly lo-


























Figure 1. Some basic mereotopological relations (from [26], p. 97); dashed lines indicate
actual sharing of parts, as opposed to mere spatiotemporal co-localization.
Moreover, given AP2 the following mereologized versions of the usual














(Like the operators in DP4{DP9, these operators may be partially dened
as we do not assume the existence of a null individual.) Hence we can dis-







All of these notions are rather well-behaved and allow one to capture a num-
ber of important mereotopological notions and facts without however forcing
our ontology. To be sure, other axioms would be needed to get reasonably
close to a full topological theory. For instance, we can obtain structures cor-
responding to ordinary topological spaces by imposing (the analogues of)
the usual closure conditions:
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AC3 Cl(x)^ Cl(y)! Cl(x+ y)
AC4 8
x










In the following, however, I shall not need the full strength of the theory
dened by such additional axioms, so I shall not digress here. (See [43] for
some material in this direction.)
Moving now to the specic topological or mereotopological axioms for
H, I assume the following:
AC5 H(x; y)! SC(x)
AC6 H(x; y)! A(x; y)
AC7 H(x; y)^ P(y; z)! (H(x; z)_ I(x; z))
AC8 H(x; y)^ PHP(z; x)! 9
w
(P(w; y)^ C(w; x)^ :C(w; z)).
These guarantee that holes are non-scattered entities (AC5) connected to
their material hosts (AC6), and that a hole's proper hole-parts (if any)
cannot be connected to the very same parts of the host as the hole itself
(AC8). (This excludes, for instance, that a single hole be identied with an
innitely descending \pile" of nested holes.) Moreover, AP4 is now derivable
from AC6. As for AC7, it expresses the intuition, anticipated in the previous
section, that holehood be also right monotonic (conditionally) with respect
to parthood: typically a mereological extension a hole's host is itself a host of
the hole. The conditional proviso can now be properly expressed by requiring
that the extended thing be spatially discrete from the hole: it must not
overlap the hole, either mereologically (as with the hybrid sum consisting
of the host plus the hole) or spatially (as with the sum consisting of the
host plus, say, a ller of the hole). This explains the disjunctive form of
the consequent of AC7, which might otherwise collide with AP4 (in case of
mereological overlap) or with AC6 (in case of mere superposition). Perhaps
there are circumstances in which AC7 may still sound too strong, for instance
in relation to the problematic nature of holes in artifacts. There is a hole
in the handle; the handle is part of the door; is the hole also a hole in the
door? It is hard to nd non-stipulative answers to these questions. But if
cases like this are found disturbing, AC7 will have to be further weakened by
imposing suitable restrictions on the part-whole relation linking the initial
host y and the relevant extension z.
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In [3] we also had an axiom to the eect that every hole has a self-
-connected host: this reected the intuition that although every hole has
innitely many decreasing hosts (by AP7), which in turn may grow indef-
initely (by AC7), every hole has a privileged host, namely the maximally
self-connected one. Every other host would be either a potential part of this
one, or a topologically scattered mereological sum including it as a proper
part. However, I am now inclined to regard this as too restrictive, i.e., stip-
ulative. Take a piece of cheese with a round cavity hidden inside it, and
suppose there is a small round piece of cheese oating right in the middle
of the cavity. There are reasons to regard this as an empty cavity in a scat-
tered host, rather than a bigger cavity in a self-connected host partially lled
by the small piece. In any event, not much of what follows depends on this
point, so the present formulation does not mark a signicant departure from
the original theory in this respect.
Another hole-specic principle that could be added to AC5{AC8 is that
holes are topologically open entities | they are bounded from the outside.
This principle was not considered in [3], but is arguably an important feature
of holes: they lack a surface of they own; their boundaries belong to their
hosts.
AC9 H(x; y)! Op(x).
One could view this as a topological manifestation of the basic ontological
truth about holes: they are parasitic upon the things hosting them. However,
the exact formulation of this axiom is not straightforward. Consider the
boundary between the hole and that part of its complement which is not
occupied by the host. If the hole is open, then that part of its boundary
should be part of the complement too. But then consider the complement
of the sum hole+host: this complement must be closed in the proximity of
the hole, but open elsewhere; for elsewhere the complement is in contact
with the host, and the host is closed. (And it follows from our denition
that two closed entities cannot be in contact.) This might well be the case,
but it would call for an explanation. Alternatively, we could simply say that
there is no boundary between the hole and the complement. That is, there
is merely a at boundary (in the terminology of [37]), as opposed to a bona
de boundary of the usual sort: the hole is an (open) undetached part of the
complement. This distinction is detailed elsewhere [42], but it would take us
too far aeld to spell it out in the present context.
Let us then focus on the basic theory dened by AC5{AC8. Among the
new theorems that can be obtained from these axioms, we have then that
two holes don't add up to a hole unless they are connected (though the
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converse need not hold: two holes superimposed on each other don't make
a hole), that a hole is connected with every host of its hole-parts, that the
hole-parts of a hole are all abutting the hosts of that hole, and so on:
TC1 H(x+ y; z)! C(x; y) (by AC5)
TC2 H(x; y)^H(z; w)! :P(y; z) (by AH1 + AP5 + AC7)
TC3 H(x; y)^H(x; z)! H(x; y+ z) (by AP4 + AC7)
TC4 H(x; y)^H(x; z)! H(x; y z) (by AP4 + AP6 + AC7)
TC5 H(x; y)^ IE(z; y)! :H(x; z)) (by AC6)
TC6 H(x; y)^ IE(z; x)! :H(z; y). (by AC6)
TC7 H(x; y)^H(z; w)! (P(z; x)! A(z; y))(by AP4 + AP8 + AC6)
TC8 H(x; y)^H(z; w)! (P(z; x)! A(x; w)) (by AC6)
Moreover, topology now allows us to express certain fundamental dierences
between holes of dierent kind. There are three main kinds: supercial holes
(or hollows) which correspond to simple depressions or indentations in the
surface of the host, and could in principle be eliminated by elastic defor-
mation; perforating holes (tunnels) which introduce non-eliminable topolog-
ical discontinuities (determining an increase in the topological genus of the
host); and internal holes (cavities) which are completely hidden inside the
host, and which therefore mark a splitting in the host's complement. These
distinctions can be uniformly expressed in terms of the intuitive notion of
an opening, or \free face". Let a free face (FF) of a hole x, relative to a given
host y, be a maximally free boundary (FB) of the hole, i.e., a maximally
connected part of the hole's (at) boundary that is nowhere connected with
the host:
DC16 FB(z; x; y)=
df
P(z;b(x))^ :C(z; y)





(FB(w; x; y)^ C(w; z)! P(w; z)).
(We shall only have use for these denitions when x and y are as specied.)
Then cavities are those holes that have no free faces: the boundary of a cavity
is entirely part of the host's boundary, and there is no way you can get out
of the cavity without digging through the host. Hollows, on the other hand,
do have a free face: you can easily pour water into them. In fact hollows
have exactly one free face, and this distinguishes them from full-edged
perforations, which always involve at least two openings | an entrance and
an exit, as it were. (If you pour water into them, it can run out from the
other side.) Formally, then, the basic distinction between internal holes (IH),
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perforating holes (PH), and supercial holes (SH) may be characterized as
follows:












(FF(z; x; y)^ FF(w; x; y)^ :C(z; w))
DC20 SH(x; y) =
df
H(x; y)^ :IH(x; y)^ :PH(x; y).
On this basis several basic facts are easily established. For instance, in addi-
tion to various simple properties about cavities (they can only abut things
that overlap their hosts, and they must be disconnected from the remaining
part of their hosts' complement), we can prove that cavities are maximal
holes, in fact maximally connected holes (they cannot be proper parts of
other holes and they include every hole with which they are connected),
that a hole cannot qualify as a hollow with respect to any part of a host
relative to which it already qualies as a tunnel, or that a hole that qualies
as a tunnel with respect to a hollow's host cannot be part of that hollow
(the host would have topologically incompatible properties). Formally:
TC9 IH(x; y)! :C(x;(x+ y))
TC10 IH(x; y)^ A(z; x)! I(z; y)
TC11 IH(x; y)^ H(z; y)! :PP(x; z)
TC12 IH(x; y)^ H(z; w)^ C(z; x)! P(z; x)
TC13 PH(x; y)^ SH(x; z)! :P(z; y)
TC14 PH(x; y)^ SH(z; y)! :P(x; z).
(On the assumption that x is a hole in y, some of these conditionals can
be strengthened to biconditionals, yielding alternative ways of inducing the
basic taxonomy of hole types. For instance, both TC9 and TC10 could serve




Figure 2. Internal hole, or cavity (a); supercial hole, or hollow (b); perforating hole, or
tunnel (c).
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The simplicity of these results is a sign of the expressive power of the
hole-based approach. As related work in the area of qualitative topological
reasoning makes clear [13, 14], the characterization of important topological
dierences | such as the dierence between a sphere and a doughnut |
seems to run afoul of the basic logic of `C' and calls for independent accounts.
Explicit reference to holes makes the account straightforward.
2.4. Morphology. The nal component of the theory is concerned with
concepts and principles that go beyond the connes of part-whole reason-
ing, showing at the same time the intrinsic limits of mereotopology and the
need for more explicit morphological (shape-oriented) analysis. The motiva-
tion is simple. The hole taxonomy outlined above reects certain peculiar
topological properties of the host objects which do not, in eect, prevent
a uniform treatment: to be a hole is to be a hollow, a tunnel, or a cavity.
However, this unity cannot be accounted for by means of mereotopological
notions: mereology says nothing at all about it; and topology allows us to
distinguish an object perforated by a tunnel (a torus) from an object with-
out (a sphere), but it is of no use to tell a hollowed object from hollowless
ones. Topologically, hollows don't count. And the reason is that topology is
object-oriented: holes count only insofar as they mark topological disconti-
nuities in their hosts. To account for all the dierences, and to appreciate
the underlying conceptual unity, we must therefore look directly at the hole,
not the object. And the idea behind the morphological component is that we
should do so by relying on a fundamental property of holes, arguably their
characteristic property: they are llable. They are spacious and involve con-
cavities, and therefore they can be lled.
Indeed much of our reasoning about holes depends upon our ability to
reason about their potential \guests", not only about their actual hosts | a
form of complementary reasoning that can be very eective. Of course, there
is a sense in which we may properly speak of lling as a relation between a
ller (say, a cork) and a material object (the neck of a bottle). In this sense
the guest lls the host, not the hole. However, this sense is parasitic on what
appears to be a more fundamental notion of lling, whereby some stu or
material body lls (parts of) a hole in another material body. To ll the
neck of a bottle is, strictly speaking, to ll the opening of the bottle, which
is part of the hole (tunnel) that goes through the neck. It is this relation
that we consider here. We indicate it by `F(x; y)', read \x lls y". In [3]
this is taken to express perfect lling, a notion that is intuitively meant to
capture the idea that a good ller perfectly heals the concave discontinuity
introduced by the hole in its host object. (The healing is dened by the
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minimal surface(s) demarcated by the hole's edge(s), corresponding to the
hole's free face(s); I'll come back to this shortly.) We can, however, assume
a more general notion of lling, allowing for incomplete llers as well as
for complete but improper (protruding) llers. Taking `F' to express such
a general notion, we can then easily dene complete, proper , and exact (or
perfect) llers respectively:




(P(z; y)! F(x; z))




(P(z; x)! F(z; y))
DF3 EF(x; y) =
df
CF(x; y)^ PF(x; y).
Thus, a hole's exact ller can be regarded as the least upper bound (rel-
ative to the partial ordering induced by P) of the hole's proper llers, or
| equivalently | as the greatest lower bound of its complete llers. The






Figure 3. Filling a hole exactly (a); properly, but not completely (b); completely, but not
properly (c); generically, i.e., neither completely nor properly (d).
Various specic notions are easily dened using the above. For instance,
a ller which, though possibly incomplete, from the outside looks indistin-
guishable from a complete one (relative to some opening) may be called a
lid of the hole. That is, a lid completely covers (hides) some free face of the
hole. (A lid may of course be proper or improper, depending on whether it
is enclosed in the hole.) Moreover, an interesting intermediate notion is that
of a bridge: a lid band connecting two opposite sides of the hole. Likewise,
among a hole's llers we may single out those that act as divisors : they
separate the hole into two parts. (There are two kinds: \vertical" and \hor-
izontal" ones, as it were. The former do not separate any part of the hole
from its complement; the latter do.) There is no need here to go into such
details. But such lines of development are worth mentioning insofar as they
are indicative of the conceptual richness implicit in the notion of a ller.
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As general axioms governing the lling relation, and more generally the
interplay between morphology and mereotopology, we then assume the fol-
lowing:
AF1 F(x; y)! S(x; y)
AF2 F(x; y)^ E(y; x)! CF(x; y)





('! F(x; y))! F(x'; y).
AF1 says that lling is a form of superposition: llers share a location with
the lled entities, but there is no sharing of parts. In particular, by AF2
and AF3, the two possible ways in which a hole and its ller may stand in
a relation of spatial enclosure correspond to the two main types of lling:
holes are enclosed in their complete llers, and enclose their proper llers.
(Hence, they are exactly co-located with their exact llers.) This guarantees
that proper and complete lling be related in the appropriate way given the
underlying mereological structure: a complete ller completely lls every
part of a hole, while every part of a proper ller properly lls the hole.
Likewise, it follows that every hole is enclosed in its complete llers and
encloses its proper llers, which implies that a hole's perfect ller can never
intersect the hole's own host. Here are the formal renderings of these basic
facts, along with the advertised equivalences showing that the choice of `F'
as a primitive as opposed to `EF' is no substantial matter:
TF1 CF(x; y)! E(y; x)
TF2 PF(x; y)! E(x; y)
TF3 EF(x; y)! E(x; y)^ E(y; x)
TF4 CF(x; y)^ P(z; y)! CF(x; z)
TF5 PF(x; y)^ P(z; x)! PF(z; y)
TF6 CF(x; y)$ 9
z
(P(z; x)^ EF(z; y))
TF7 PF(x; y)$ 9
z
(P(z; y)^ EF(x; z))
TF8 F(x; y)$ 9
z
(P(z; x)^ PF(z; y))
TF9 F(x; y)$ 9
z
(P(z; y)^ CF(x; z)).
As for AF4, this axiom will not play any specic role in the following, but it
is added here for the sake of completeness. TF5 shows that every part of a
proper ller is in turn a ller, but of course this form of monotonicity does
not hold in the opposite direction: the sum ller+hole, for instance, is not
a ller of the hole (by AF1) even if it includes a ller. However, we would
© 1997 by Nicolaus Copernicus University
22 Achille C. Varzi
like to say that in some cases enlarging a ller yields a bigger ller. At the
very least, the result of putting together two or more llers should always
yield a ller. This is precisely what AF4 guarantees. Among other things,
we have the following closure conditions:
TF10 PF(x; y)^ PF(z; y)! PF(x+ z; y)
TF11 CF(x; y)^ CF(z; y)! CF(x+ z; y).
AF1{AF4 dene the basic framework needed to express the idea that
holes are llable entities. There is admittedly much in common between
the relations of lling and that of superposition; indeed there are very close
and interesting relationships between the fundamental algebra of lling and
the structure of spatial location (this is detailed in [4]). Yet the two must
be kept separate: superposition is a purely geometric relation which may
hold among entities of various kind (among events, for instance, at least
according to some theories); lling is a substantial relation expressing the
fundamental pattern of interaction between holes and material bodies, and
that is what makes it relevant for the purpose of morphological analysis. This
is not explicit yet in the general background theory dened by AF1{AF4.
But it can be made explicit as soon as we proceed to the specic axioms
governing the interplay between the new morphological primitive, F, and the
fundamental relation of the hole-theory, H:









(H(z; w)^ P(x; z))! :F(x; y).
AF5 expresses the idea that llability is an exclusive property of holes and
parts thereof. Conversely, AF6 says that holes and parts of holes don't ll
anything. This is not merely to express the intuition that holes are imma-
terial. Surely insofar as they are immaterial they cannot ll anything |
they always leave room for things. But it will be useful to allow for some
exibility in this regard. It will be useful, for instance, to treat the airy
plug that always oats inside an \empty" hole as a ller of that hole | a
perfect ller, albeit a very feeble one. The reason to exclude holes from the
domain of F is, rather, that we want once again to put a clear upper bound
on the number of immaterial parasites that can inhabit what | in ordinary
thinking | is the region of a single hole. If holes could be llers, nothing
(not even the extensionality axiom AP3) would prevent an innity of holes
to be exactly co-located, each lling the next one in an endless sequence of
perfectly superimposed holes. Besides, as we shall see shortly, we must leave
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room for the possibility that a ller be itself holed, and this would collide
with AH1 were holes allowed to qualify themselves as bona de llers.
Given this, it is obvious that AF1 implies that lling is irreexive,
whereas AF6 implies that it is also asymmetrical and secondarily non-se-
rial: llables can't ll. Further simple consequences of the axioms are listed
below:
TF12 :F(x; x) (by AP1 + AF1)
TF13 F(x; y)! :F(y; x) (by AF1 + AF6)
TF14 F(x; y)! :F(y; z) (by AF1 + AF6)
TF15 H(x; y)! :F(z; y) (by AH1 + AP5{6 + AF5)
TF16 H(x; y)! :F(y; x) (by AC6 + AF1)
TF17 H(x; y)^ EF(z; x)! A(z; y) (by AC6 + AF1{3)
TF18 H(x; y)^ CF(z; x)! E(x; z) (by AF2)
TF19 H(x; y)^ PF(z; x)! E(z; x) (by AF3)
It bears emphasis that nothing prevents the possibility that an exact
ller be holed, or that a hole in a complete ller be completely lled by
the hole's host. (Think of a wedding ring frozen inside an ice cube: the ring
is a holed exact ller of the doughnut-shaped cavity in the cube, and the
cube is a complete inexact ller of the hole in the ring.) This is not only
intuitively correct. By exploiting this possibility, we can actually improve
our basic taxonomy in more than one way. We can distinguish, for instance,
between an ordinary, spherical internal cavity and a doughnut-shaped one
(a cavity-tunnel in the terminology of [3]): the latter is characterized by
the possession of a perfect ller which is doughnut-shaped, hence perforated
by a tunnel; the former has a topologically spherical perfect ller. And we
can distinguish between these two cases and the case of an internal cavity
whose perfect ller involves an internal cavity | a cavity completely lled
by (part of) the host of the bigger cavity. (This is a case of a hole with no
self-connected host, as discussed above.) We may call these three types of
internal holes simple cavities (SIH), doughnut cavities (DIH), and capsule
cavities (CIH), respectively:














DF6 SIH(x; y) =
df
IH(x; y)^ :DIH(x; y)^ :CIH(x; y).
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Figure 4. A simple cavity (a), a doughnut-cavity (b), and a capsule cavity (c) are distin-
guished by the topology of their llers, respectively a ball (holeless), a doughnut (with a
tunnel), and a capsule (with an internal cavity).
Similar denitions will allow us to distinguish further subcategories of
holes. For instance, if we take x to be a supercial rather than internal hole,
then DF4 turns into a characterization of grooves . A groove is a circumclud-
ing hollow (a sort of \open" tunnel): the hole goes all around the host, and
its exact ller involves a hole, in fact a perforation (completely but improp-
erly lled by the host). Likewise for the other cases. Indeed the algebra of
lling and its various ramications form an interesting topic of its own. One
can investigate, for instance, to what extent the morphological complexity
of a hole is mirrored in the topological structure of its \skin", i.e., that part
of the host's surface that is externally connected with the hole's exact ller.
Further enrichments and renements of the taxonomy can also be obtained
by investigating the many ways holes can be branching or knotted together,
as suggested in [5]. This shows once again that explicit commitment to holes
may have very advantageous consequences: if holes are bona de entities, one
can investigate these aspects by relying explicitly on standard tree and knot
theories.
At this point a nal remark is in order. I have said that the morphological
component of the theory is meant to go beyond mereotopology in the direc-
tion of a more shape-oriented account. This should not be taken to suggest
that the morphological axioms x the intended interpretation of the theory
so that `H(x; y)' really means \x is a hole in (or through) y". They do not,
in fact: the bizarre patterns in Figure 5 (b{d) are perfectly compatible with
everything said so far. Rather, the axioms are to be taken as specications
of certain basic elucidations of (or constraints on) the notion of a hole, which
was and remains the fundamental primitive of the theory. We assume holes
to be intuitively understood (recognized, counted, etc.) and we introduce
axioms to make explicit certain features that we regard as constitutive of
the hole concept. This is the general idea behind the strategy followed here;
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and it is in this sense that the intended model of the theory will not contain





Figure 5. Only a is a hole; b, c, d, and the like violate the intuitive condition that a hole's
perfect llers reconstruct the ideal surface of the host object.
Could we rule out such undesired interpretations explicitly? To some
extent an answer in the armative is possible, provided the language is
suitably enriched; but I have no sense of how one can aim at a complete the-
ory. By way of illustration, suppose we add a new primitive operator `h(x)'
associating each entity x with its \convex hull" | intuitively, the region
that would be enclosed if x were wrapped in a taught rubber membrane
(Figure 6). This operator could be axiomatized along the lines of [10, 31,
32]:
Ah1 TE(x;h(x))
Ah2 h(h(x)) = h(x)
Ah3 E(x; y)! P(h(x);h(y))
Ah4 P(h(x) + h(y);h(x+ y))
Ah5 P(h(x y);h(x) h(y)).
(These axioms are only indicative and are not meant to form a complete
system. Actually the denition of a complete system is | I believe | still
an open question; see [9] for a recent assessment.) On this basis we could
then add explicit principles aimed at capturing the intuition that holes go
hand in hand with concavities. In particular, we could express a basic feature
of this intuition by requiring that a hole be always enclosed in the convex
hull of its host:
AF7 H(x; y)! E(x;h(y)).
The undesired patterns in gure 5 will then be ruled out, and only the
leftmost pattern will qualify as a case of an object with a hole (a hollow, in
eect).
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Figure 6. A blob with its convex hull. (Here the blob is self-connected, but the notion of
a convex hull applies as well to entities that consist of two or more disconnected pieces.)
This way of attacking the issue should not be overestimated. Perhaps
it is worth pointing out that AF7, together with AC6, imply the stronger
condition that a hole be always enclosed in that part of the convex hull that
does not intersect the host, i.e, the dierence between the convex hull and
the region occupied by the host:
TF20 H(x; y)! E(x;h(y))^ :I(x; y).
However, this conditional does not hold in the other direction, hence we
cannot exploit the convex hull operator to dene holes. Obviously this is
because not every part of a hole qualies as a hole, though it is enclosed
wherever the hole is. But we cannot rely on the converse of TF20 even if we
considered exclusively those parts of h(y)   zE(z; y) that are maximally
connected. There are two distinct reasons. For one thing, the exact llers
of a hole satisfy exactly the same conditions as the hole itself as far as
their location is concerned. An exact ller is enclosed in the very same part
of the convex hull as the hole it lls; yet llers are material bodies, holes
immaterial. Secondly, and more importantly, even if we focused exclusively
on immaterial bodies, the converse of TF20 would be too strong: a sphere
with a horn does not have any hole, yet the result of removing it from its
convex hull does leave room for an immaterial body. The best we could say
is something like this:





That is, the llable entities that are enclosed in the relevant remainder of
the convex hull are parts of holes | whence a suitable characterization of
hole parts follows using AF6. But of course, this would not serve the purpose
of explaining away holes in terms of convex hulls: for the notion of lling is
conceptually dependent on that of hole. That is what AF6 amounts to in the
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rst place. (This is clear from the two pairs of patterns in Figure 7. In each
case the two patterns satisfy the same conditions; yet one corresponds to a
hole, the other does not.) In short, holehood must be assumed as a primitive
even if its general geometric earmarks may be fully spelled out. Some holes





Figure 7. Holes are hard to dene in terms of convex hulls: (a) a hole with a spike vs. (b)
a spike with no hole; (c) a hole in a scattered host vs. (d) some empty space between two
scattered parts.
3. Examples and Developments: the Geometry of Containment
The theory sketched above illustrates the level of formalization that can be
achieved, as well as the way dierent domains come to interact, when we set
ourselves to spell out a common-sense theory of such ordinary and yet philo-
sophically neglected entities as holes. The result is not only a theory about
holes, though. It is also a hole-based theory about space, or more precisely
about spatial relations. And the interplay among these dierent domains
involved in the theory (ontology, mereology, topology, and morphology) as
well as between these and other domains (such as kinematics or causality) is
a fertile line of research not only from a formal ontological perspective, but
also for the purpose of spatial reasoning and representation. In the remain-
der of the paper I would like to illustrate this fact in connection with some
indicative examples. In particular, I shall focus on some issues pertaining to
the modelling of spatial inclusion. My purpose is mostly taxonomic: I wish
to show that explicit commitment to holes can be quite helpful in singling
out and keeping track of some relevant distinctions (without pretense of
completeness). But I also hope to show that a full-blown theory will enjoy
some derivative advantages with regard to both conceptual adequacy and
applicative range.
3.1. Insides. A preliminary example coming from natural language pro-
cessing is provided by the analysis of prepositions of spatial containment
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such as `in' (or `inside'). Consider rst how our machinery permits a clear
account of the idiosyncrasies involved in such arguments as the following:
Ex1
There is a hole in the brick.
The brick is in the wall.
X There is a hole in the wall.
Ex2
There is a hole in the cheese.
The cheese is in the bucket.
" There is a hole in the bucket.
The dierent degree of acceptability of these inferences depends on the re-
lationship between the dierent occurrences of `in' in the relevant premisses
and conclusion. The rst argument is non-problematic because it simply re-
ects the monotonicity of `in' as a relation of ontological dependence (rst
premiss) relative to `in' as a relation of mereological parthood (second pre-
miss) | a principle that here was actually assumed as an axiom (AC7) of the
topological segment. (Note how dicult it would be to express this principle
in a hole-free language, where the holehood relation is replaced by a holed-
ness predicate.) By contrast, the illegitimacy of the second inference can be
explained in terms of failure of the transitivity of `in' as we move from the
relation of ontological dependence (hole in the cheese) to that of spatial con-
tainment (cheese in the bucket). In other words, the basic relation H is mono-
tonic with respect to actual parthood, but not to the (homonymous) relation
of containment. Note of course that transitivity is restored if we take both
premisses and conclusion to express a relation of containment: in that case
it follows unproblematically that the hole is contained in the bucket, though
presumably this is not what is ordinarily meant by the sentence in question.
Now, a satisfactory account of `in' as a relation of spatial containment
is by itself an intricate issue. Some authors have suggested an explanation
in terms of convex locative inclusion [15, 18, 46] or mereological inclusion in
the convex hull of the containing object [10, 28, 30, 31, 32]: something x is
in something y just in case (the region occupied by) x is part of the convex
hull of (the region occupied by) y. Thus, for instance, with reference to the
leftmost pattern of Figure 8, the y is in the glass but the ant is not. As
already indicated in [17], however, this approach fails to appreciate the es-
sential role of containing parts as opposed to other non-convex parts. Think
of a y near the stem of a wine glass: it may well fall within the convex
hull of the glass, but that does not make it a y in the glass (Figure 8b). In
other words, reference to the convex hull does not succeed in singling out
the regions that are relevant for the purpose of spatial inclusion. Focusing
© 1997 by Nicolaus Copernicus University
Reasoning About Space: The Hole Story 29
exclusively on the convex hull of the object's containing parts (as consid-
ered in [39]) is also inadequate. For, apart from the seeming circularity, the
outer boundaries of such parts may themselves involve concavities (Figure
8c). This is pointed out in [1, 44], where a multi-level account is proposed
eventually emphasizing the functional dimension of containment. ([39] also




Figure 8. Inclusion in the convex hull is not a criterion for being in the glass ([44], p. 207).
Within the framework outlined above, where holes are accepted as bona
de individuals, the diculty can be approached perspicuously by relying
on the analogy between lling and being in. Roughly, to be contained in an
object is to be in a hole of that object; and something is in a hole (wholly
or partially) when it can be said to ll the hole (properly or not):




(H(z; y)^ F(x; z))




(P(z; x)! IN(z; y))
DI3 PIN(x; y) =
df
IN(x; y)^ :WIN(x; y).
Thus, in the patterns corresponding to b and c in Figure 8, the y is not in
the glass because it does not ll any hole in the glass. It is located within
part of the convex hull of the glass that is not occupied by the glass; but,
as we saw, not every such region corresponds to a hole. And only those
that do should be taken into account in relation to the question of spatial
containment.
In making this suggestion, I take it of course that the containing part
of a glass determines a true hole | a hollow, in eect | though there are
other senses in which a glass can be said to be holed. (It may have a small
perforation in the stem, for instance | I shall come back this shortly.) At the
same time, what exactly counts as a hole or a containing part is not at issue
here: the account is eective precisely insofar as the existence of independent
criteria for holehood is presupposed | e.g., insofar as the space around the
stem of a glass is not taken to be a hole. Surely one can imagine to ll up that
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space with plasticine; but we have seen that reasoning exclusively in terms
of lling is deceptive: the notion of lling depends essentially on that of a
hole. We have a criterion for something to be a ller of a hole, but holes exist
and are what they are prior to their llers. (If we took the space around the
stem as a hole, then the y would be in the glass, on the present account.)
It also bears emphasis that this suggestion is not meant to imply that
every case of containment is reducible to hole lling, exible as the relevant
notion of a hole may be. If the glass has a handle, the hole (tunnel) dened
by the handle should not count for the purpose of deciding whether the y
is in the glass. Perhaps the stem or the containing part itself is perforated:
then, again, a y in such a hole (perforation) would not be in the glass.
Or again, to use a related example from [40], the bulb is in the socket, but
the bottle is not in the cap | or so one could argue. (In other cases, lling
a hole is not even a necessary condition for containment: think of a bird
in the tree [17].) It is apparent that these counterexamples show the limits
of the approach insofar as the approach is purely geometric (topological or
morphological): a full account calls for a decisive step into other territories.
Most likely these include at least some pragmatics, or functional and causal
factors at large, as suggested in [1] and [40]. However, the point remains that
explicit reference to holes can mark an improvement as far as the geometric
part of the story goes. It is true that geometry is not the whole story; but
this truth should simply be taken to imply that something else (as I said, a
pragmatic or functional explanation) will eventually have to be taken into
account. In other words, only some holes count for the purpose of reasoning
about containment. But which holes do so count is not a question for the
geometric analysis of the problem. (Formally, this means that the bound
variable z in DI1 will have to be further restricted, so that only holes of a
certain kind and bearing certain relations to the contained object should be
taken as admissible values. In the following, however, I shall presume such
restrictions to be either forgiveable or tacitly understood.)
Figure 9. Further diculties with the relation of containment: in both cases the y is in
a hole hosted by the glass, but not in the glass itself.
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3.2. Containing hulls. On this basis | and within these limits | the
picture can be rened in various ways. To begin with, we can relax the
requirement that x must ll a hole in y in order for x to be in y: we might
want to say that a hole is inside the glass (just like the piece of cheese that
hosts it), though we know that holes don't ll anything by AF6. To this end,
we may simply extend DI1{DI3 by relying on the relation of intersection
































Of course, this implies that every hole is contained in its host (though im-
materially, so to say):
TI1 H(x; y)! IN
0
(x; y)^ :IN(x; y).
Alternatively, we could achieve the same characterization by revisiting
the original convex-hull operator (acting on a domain of regions) in terms
of a \containing-hull" operator acting directly on objects. In our framework
this can be introduced as a function k yielding the fusion of any given object








could then be characterized in terms of this operator:
TI2 IN
0
(x; y)$ I(x; k(y)  y)
TI3 WIN
0








As is might be expected, these equivalences turn out to be analogous to
those that can be obtained from the convex-hull-based approach upon re-
placing convex hulls by containing hulls (see [10] for a comparison). On the
other hand, it follows from AF7 that k(y) is always enclosed in h(y) (indeed
tangentially enclosed, by Ah1), though the converse may fail:
TI5 TE(k(x);h(y)).
Thus, only some of the relations dened in terms of h(y) hold upon replace-
ment of `h' by `k'. For instance, y might be a holeless non-convex object
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(such as the block with protruding spike of Figure 7), in which case k(y)
would be (= y and) properly enclosed in h(y).
Several additional notions could be introduced at this point. In partic-
ular, we can immediately make the distinction between generic inside and
\just inside"










and we can make the picture more complete by dening also the relations
of being generically, wholly, or just \outside" a given object.
DI7 OUT(x; y) =
df
:I(x; k(y))
DI8 JOUT(x; y) =
df
A(x; k(y))
DI9 WOUT(x; y) =
df
OUT(x; y)^ :JOUT(x; y).
Thus, an object is properly inside another if and only if no part of it is





(P(z; x)! :OUT(z; y))





The natural transition from the two extreme positions, corresponding to
the relations WOUT and WIN
0










Figure 10. Natural transition of an object x from wholly outside (left) to wholly inside
(right) a hollowed object y.
Note that none of the relations thus dened is fully transitive. They
are not asymmetric either, except for WIN and JIN, and of course they





WOUT satisfy certain basic forms of dissectivity or monotonicity that have
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no analogue for PIN (PIN
0
) or JOUT: for instance, it is easily veried that
the parts of whatever is wholly inside or (wholly) outside an object y are
also so related to y, although what is (partially) in y may obviously have




TI10 WIN(x; y)! :WIN(y; x)
TI11 JIN(x; y)! :JIN(y; x)
TI12 JIN(x; y)^ JOUT(z; y)! :I(x; z)
TI13 IN(x; y)^ P(z; x)! IN(z; y)
TI14 IN
0
(x; y)^ P(z; x)! IN
0
(z; y)
TI15 WIN(x; y)^ P(z; x)!WIN(z; y)
TI16 WOUT(x; y)^ P(z; x)!WOUT(z; y).
It is immediately seen that this characterization can then be further
specialized to support richer taxonomies such as the ones introduced in [10,
30, 32], which are based on the general convex-hull approach mentioned
above. The generating schema is the following:
DI10 -	-R(x; y) =
df
(x; y)^ 	(y; x)^ :R(x; y),
where in general  and 	 are any of the containment relations dened above
and R is any of O, S, or C. I leave the computation of the number of distinct
relations generated by D19 to the reader. Further notions can be obtained
by fully exploiting the algebra of spatial location, as indicated in [4].
3.3. Further modes of containment. As I said, it is not claimed that the
relations introduced above allow for a full account of the notion of spatial
containment, or even for a full solution of the y-in-the glass problem. Even
so, several useful renements can be introduced already at the geometrical
level, including some applications to naive-physical reasoning about contain-
ment (in the spirit of [16]). For instance, we have already seen that we can
distinguish between an inside that involves true \lling" (as in DI1) from
that of a \vacuous", purely geometrical inside:




(x; y)^ :IN(x; y).
The latter, but not the former, would apply to the case of the small hole
inside a bigger one.
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Likewise, in both cases we can account for the distinction between generic
inside and strict topological inside, the latter occurring only in the presence
of internal holes. And we may distinguish between partial and whole topo-
logical inside depending on whether the guest object is partially or wholly
enclosed in the relevant hole, or, more generally, whether or not every part
of the guest object is topologically inside the host object. The denition are
as follows




(IH(z; y)^ F(x; z))




(P(z; x)^ TIN(z; y))
DI14 PTIN(x; y) =
df
TIN(x; y)^ :WTIN(x; y).
(The corresponding notions for the vacuous case can be obtained by putting
`I' in place of `F' in DI12, though it probably makes little intuitive sense
to speak of an immaterial entity such as a hole being forcefully kept inside
another hole: if it so happens, it is because its host is kept inside. Similar
remarks apply to the notions dened below, which will only be given in
terms of lling inside.) Of course this implies that topological inside can
never be partial unless the guest is scattered, and that something is wholly
topologically inside an object only if it cannot move to the outside without
cutting through the object itself (think of a maggot eating its way out of a
cavity in a wheel of Swiss cheese):
TI17 TIN(x; y)^ SC(x)!WTIN(x; y)
TI18 WTIN(x; y)! 8
z
(SC(z)^ C(z; x)^ C(z;k(y))! I(z; y)).
In a similar manner we can account for other cases in which the guest
object cannot be let free without cutting. Topological inside dene one such
case (Figure 11a); another is what may be labelled \constrained inside" (b):
the hole is open and the object inside it is or can be put in contact with
the outside, but the presence of a topological discontinuity constraints its
freedom to move.









(IH(u; w)^ IE(u; k(y))^ E(u; k(x))))).
From a naive-physical perspective this is perhaps one of the most important
patterns of interaction relating to holes: keeping material objects (llers)
in place, or at least hindering their movement. There are of course many
other such patterns besides topological constraint. For instance, a plugger
is typically a complete, non-exact ller some parts of which are externally
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connected with the host but not with the hole, so that its translational
freedom [33] is constrained. Or take the last two cases depicted in Figure 11
(c, d). Here the guest object is kept inside the host by virtue of morphological
constraints. Unlike a and b, the guest could be let free without altering the
topology; but unlike the basic pattern in Figure 10, x can be let free only
if y or x itself is suitably deformed. Again, we reach here a point where
pure mereotopological reasoning shows its limits | shapes become crucial.
And shapes are not the end of the story either. A square complete ller
will be kept in place by its square hole, but a round ller will rotate in its
circular hole. One would need here to investigate the frictional properties of
the stu of both host and guest, and an explicit step into the territory of
naive kinematics seems required in order to capture the relevant distinctions.













Figure 11. Patterns of constrained inside. In some cases the constraint is purely topological
(a, b); other cases depend crucially on the morphology of the contained and containing
objects (c, d).
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